The CIA for more intrusive overflights, and that President Kennedy had authorized every overflight ever recommended. Thus showed that the SGA had not turned down any written requests from Security Council ’s Special Group Augmented (SGA) for submission to the president. Overflights, if proposed, would not be sanctioned by the National The CIA had understood, in no uncertain terms, that intrusive Coming away from the September 10 meeting at the White House, Restrictive overflight policy might not appear to be as clear-cut as it Not-detect the ballistic missile deployments then under way.” Īlso observed in 1962, and quite correctly, that responsibility for the Not-and since they were designed to avoid SAM-defended areas, could New facets of the Soviet military build-up. Lehman noted then that the U-2 overflights permittedĪfter September 10 were successful, inasmuch as they had established Inġ962, however, the OCI officer was much more circumspect about how he “shot himself in the foot” by attenuating U-2 coverage over Cuba. Lehman’s blunt recollection in 2004 was that President Kennedy had Something” about the unprecedented Soviet military buildup on the Incident was a casus belli that provided the perfect opportunity to “do Sovereign airspace, while at home, conservative critics would claim the Overflights would climax in a fatal incident that would put Kennedy in a double bind: abroad he would be criticized for violating BundyĪnd Rusk were deeply concerned that continuation of intrusive Surveillance aircraft were being installed all over the island. Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) capable of downing the high-altitude

Protect the president before and during the Bay of Pigs debacle, wereĪnxious to prevent an embarrassing U-2 incident over Cuba now that Men, still smarting over criticism that they had not done enough to Security adviser, in concert with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. “crucial to the record.” On that day, anĬonvened at the White House by McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s national With respect to the collection deficit, Lehman Of what had happened in the weeks leading up to the discovery of the It was not exhaustive, but did reflect the gist The report was accurate, careful, and, ifĪnything, understated. Of nearly 100 pages on the events leading up to the Soviet missiles’ĭetection. Consequently, within four days, Lehman had a manuscript Habit of keeping meticulous memoranda of actions, Lehman’s research was aided greatly by fact that McCone had a Handwritten notation: “Save for the Pearl Harbor hearings-if some, orĪny”). Recalled, “what we right, what we wrong, and so “McCone wanted to know how we had got there,” Lehman later Meant Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had come shockingly close to accomplishing his strategic fait accompli. Just days before the CIA would deem some of them operational. Hand until October 15, more than a month after they had arrived in Cuba and Greater moment, the first hard evidence of the SSMs ’ deployment was not in Surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) on Cuban soil. Predicted that the Soviets were not likely to implant All the intelligence estimates prepared prior to mid-October of the first magnitude,” as the lateĪlexander George, a Stanford professor, put it inġ974. Were in, the missile crisis could be fairly called a “near-failure ofĪmerican intelligence. Rovere, the New Yorker’s Washington correspondent, observed in early 1963, “the handling of the October crisis was, of course, superb (an easy ex post facto judgment, based wholly upon success).” ĬIA’s margin of success had actually been dangerously narrow. Which were still smarting from the Bay of Pigs debacle of the previous year. The Kennedy administration and the intelligence community, both of The missile crisis would be perceived as a sorely-needed triumph for The public terms of the settlement all but guaranteed that

Cia inspector john earman